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SUPREME COURT  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

KITTITAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington,  
BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON (BIAW),  
CENTRAL WASHINGTON HOME BUILDERS (CWHBA),  
MITCHELL WILLIAMS, d/b/a MF WILLIAMS CONSTRUCTION CO.,  
TEANAWAY RIDGE, LLC, KITTITAS COUNTY FARM BUREAU,  
and SON VIDA II,  
Petitioners,

v.

KITTITAS COUNTY CONSERVATION, RIDGE, FUTUREWISE,  
EASTERN WASHINGTON GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS  
BOARD, and DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Respondents.

**KITTITAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE  
TO AMICUS BRIEF OF  
CITY OF ROSLYN**

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October 6, 2010

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ATTACHMENT TO EMAIL

RESPONSE TO ROSLYN  
AMICUS BRIEF

 ORIGINAL

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23 RESPONSE TO ROSLYN  
24 AMICUS BRIEF

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Kittitas County, respondent before the Growth Management Hearings Board, submits this response to the amicus brief submitted by Roslyn supporting its position that Kittitas County's (County) development regulations comport with the Growth Management Act (GMA) Ch. 36.70A RCW. This brief will demonstrate GMA compliance in two basic areas of the County's development regulations- (1) rural densities, (2) and protection of quantity and quality of water.

## II. ISSUES

The two issues relevant to Roslyn's amicus brief were denominated before the Hearings Board as Issues number two and four.<sup>1</sup> Issue number two stated "Does Kittitas County's failure to prohibit urban uses and urban development in rural areas in chapter 16.09, 17.12, 17.29, and 17.36 KCC and the failure to include standards to protect the rural area violate RCW 36.70A.020 (1-2, 8-10, 12), 36.70A.040, 36.70A.070, 36.70A.110, and 36.70A.130?"<sup>2</sup> The Hearings Board found that the issues relating to Performance-base Cluster Plats (Ch. 16.09 KCC) and the

<sup>1</sup> Final Decision Order March 21, 2008 Hearings Board cause #07-1-0015 ("FDO") pages 15 and 26.

<sup>2</sup> FDO at 15.

1 Zoning Designation Map (Ch. 17.12 KCC) were abandoned by the  
2 Petitioners (Futurewise), and so were not decided in the FDO.<sup>3</sup> The  
3 Hearings Board found the remaining aspects of issue number two to be  
4 noncompliant with the Growth Management Act (GMA)<sup>4</sup> and the County  
5 appealed.<sup>5</sup> Kittitas County did not appeal any issues related to Planned  
6 Unit Development (PUD) or Cluster Platting from the Hearing Board  
7 cause number 07-1-0004c, it only appealed issues relating to the GMA-  
8 appropriateness of rural three-acre density.<sup>6</sup> Hence, the only issue relevant  
9 to Roslyn's amicus brief's discussion of rural density appealed by Kittitas  
10 County only concerns PUD's.

11 Issue number four stated "Does Kittitas County's failure to require  
12 that all land within a common ownership or scheme of development be  
13 included within one application for a division of land (KCC 16.04) violate  
14 RCW 36.70A.020 (6, 8, 10, 12), 36.70A.040, 36.70A.060, 36.70A.070,  
15 36.70A.130, and 36.70A.177?"<sup>7</sup> The Hearings Board found that "Kittitas  
16 County's KCC 16.04 fails to protect water quality and quantity as required  
17  
18

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 3 FDO at 21.

21 4 FDO at 59.

22 5 Petition for Review in cause number 271234.

23 6 Petition for Review in cause number 265480.

24 7 FDO at 26.

1 by RCW's 36.70A.020(10) and 36.70A.070(5)(c)(iv)''<sup>8</sup> and the County  
2 appealed.<sup>9</sup>

### 3 III. ARGUMENT

#### 4 A. Factual Inaccuracies

5 Roslyn's motion to file its amicus brief, and the brief itself, contain  
6 numerous factual inaccuracies. The majority of Roslyn's motion and brief  
7 relate to a trio of PUD applications that are currently under consideration  
8 by Kittitas County.<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that, because these  
9 applications have not yet been decided by Kittitas County, they, by  
10 definition, are not a part of the record in this matter. They have not been  
11 ruled upon or even considered by the Hearing Board. Nothing about them  
12 formed the basis for any of the issues on appeal here. Even if Roslyn  
13 accurately relayed facts about these application, which it does not, those  
14 facts did not form the basis for the County's decision that was appealed to  
15 the Hearings Board, nor the basis of the Hearings Board's decision that  
16 has been appealed to you. They are in no way properly before this court.<sup>11</sup>  
17

18  
19 <sup>8</sup> FDO at 31.

<sup>9</sup> Petition for Review in cause number 271234.

<sup>10</sup> Roslyn's motion at 3-4.

<sup>11</sup> Despite the complete irrelevance of these three PUD applications to the matters on  
21 appeal here, the County does wish to correct the record as to them. The three PUD  
22 applications described on pages 3-4 of Roslyn's motion are respectively denominated as

1 New issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal by amici curiae.

2 *Harmon v. DSHS*, 134 Wn.2d 523, 544, 951 P.2d 770 (1998). Kittitas

3 County accordingly asks the Court to disregard the brief filed by Roslyn.

4 The brief of Roslyn contains numerous factual inaccuracies. At  
5 page 3, Roslyn asserts the County appealed the Hearings Board's rulings  
6 as to PUD and cluster plats, when, as explained above, the County has  
7 only appealed a limited issue related to its PUD regulation. At page 3 of  
8 its brief, Roslyn asserts there is no evidence in the administrative record  
9 supporting the County's three-acre zoning, but such evidence does exist,  
10 and the County has drawn attention to it previously in its briefing. Kittitas  
11 County's public process used to amend its comprehensive plan produced  
12 testimony and evidence in the record supportive of the County's three-acre  
13

14  
15 the Marion Meadows PUD in Easton, WA, the Black Gold PUD in Ronald, WA, and the  
16 No. 5 Canyon PUD in Cle Elum, WA. On page 4 of Roslyn's motion it describes each of  
17 these proposed PUD's as requiring urban services, yet they only require water (which is a  
18 rural service under the GMA) and none require sewer service (which is urban under the  
19 GMA), and so do not require urban services. On pages 4-5 of its motion, Roslyn alleges  
20 that the Marion Meadows PUD, located 12 miles from Roslyn, affects its UGA  
21 without any support nor acknowledgement that it can comment as this project moves  
22 forward should it really believe it is impacted somehow. At pages 6-7 of its motion,  
23 Roslyn makes assertions about County approval despite the fact no such approval has yet  
24 occurred. Roslyn misrepresents that these developments will have water provided by  
25 exempt wells, when they are proposed to be served by class A systems with water rights.  
The assertion that the Marion Meadows PUD, 12 miles from Roslyn in Easton, will affect  
Roslyn's watershed is speculative at this time. The Marion Meadows PUD is actually  
annexed into the Easton Water District.

1 zoning harmonizing the goals and objectives of the GMA.<sup>12</sup> The  
2 testimony found there by Lila Hanson, Pat Deneen, and Urban Eberhart  
3 from the Kittitas County Farm Bureau, are in accord that three-acre zoning  
4 preserves the rural character and promotes agriculture.<sup>13</sup> Their testimony  
5 is unified in its assertion that, by allowing farmers to sell off the smallest  
6 portion of agriculturally marginal land possible for cash flow purposes in  
7 low-irrigation years, it allows the farmer to remain economically  
8 competitive by being able to retain the greatest amount of productive farm  
9 land.<sup>14</sup> This allows farmers to retain the most agriculturally valuable farm  
10 land possible for subsequent better farming years, thereby promoting  
11 agriculture and preserving rural character.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, at page 9 of its  
12 brief, Roslyn asserts that proposals are going forward creating densities  
13 greater than surrounding municipalities, without any factual support  
14 whatsoever. There is nothing in the record in this matter that would  
15 support such a proposition. It is not the job of a court to search for  
16 authority for a party's arguments that are unsupported by authority.  
17 *Orwick v. Seattle*, 103 Wn.2d 249, 256, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). Without  
18

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 12 AR 1746-1779 attached to County's Opening Brief in cause number 271234 as  
21 Exhibit "A."

22 13 *Id.*

23 14 *Id.*

24 15 *Id.*



1 citation to authority, it is presumed that none exists and the issue will not  
2 be judicially considered. *In re Rosier*, 105 Wn.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d  
3 1353 (1986).

4 On pages one and two of its brief, Roslyn asserts that the County's  
5 land use decisions have created a "*de facto*, unilateral adjustment to the  
6 City's UGA." There is no evidence in the record supporting the notion  
7 that urban services are being provided or required outside of urban areas,  
8 and so no impact upon municipalities to provide such services can be  
9 supported. Because the issue of impacts of development upon Roslyn has  
10 never been briefed nor ruled upon by the Hearings Board, it is not properly  
11 a part of this appeal. New issues may not be raised for the first time on  
12 appeal by amici curiae. *Harmon v. DSHS*, 134 Wn.2d 523, 544, 951 P.2d  
13 770 (1998).  
14

## 15 B. Misrepresentations of Law

### 16 1. Density

17 On page 2 of its brief, Roslyn asserts that the County has an  
18 obligation to ensure that new development will not adversely affect  
19 existing water rights. Roslyn cites to no authority for this proposition  
20 because none exists. As briefed in response to both the DOE and  
21

1 Earthjustice, RCW 90.03.290 provides the Department of Ecology the  
2 mandate and authority to protect existing water rights, yet Title 90 RCW  
3 creates no role or authority for a county to engage in such a consideration.

4 At pages 4 and 7 of its brief, Roslyn asserts that there is no  
5 limitation on PUD's, three-acre zoning, (and cluster plats, even though as  
6 to what Kittitas County appealed, that issue was abandoned before the  
7 Hearings Board and so not a part of this appeal.) Kittitas County's  
8 development regulations provide for additional controls on three acre-  
9 zoning that harmonize and foster the planning goals of the GMA. Any  
10 zoning designation must comport with KCC 17.04.020, which requires  
11 that the designation promote the "public health, safety, morals and general  
12 welfare" as well as comport with all other laws and regulations. AR 740.  
13 This promotes and harmonizes the health, safety, and economic  
14 development concerns voiced in the intent section of the GMA at RCW  
15 36.70A.010. Similarly, KCC 17.98.020(5) requires that all rezones (a)  
16 comport with the comprehensive plan, (b) bear a substantial relationship to  
17 the public health, safety or welfare, (c) have merit and value for the  
18 County, (d) be appropriate due to a change in circumstance or reasonable  
19 development or need for more land in that zoning designation, (e) that  
20  
21  
22

1 land must be suitable for development in the sought zone, (f) not be a  
2 detriment to neighboring properties, and (g) not adversely impact  
3 irrigation delivery. AR 879. This harmonizes the GMA concerns for  
4 protection of rural character, economic development, protection of  
5 resource lands, prevention of sprawl, consistency, and provision for capital  
6 facilities. Finally, KCC 17.04.060 provides limits upon the amount of  
7 land in Kittitas County that can be in the various smaller rural zoning  
8 designations-3 to 5 %. This is substantially less than the 5.5% zoned  
9 greater than one dwelling per two acres that was not found to violate the  
10 GMA in *Thurston County v. WWGMHB*, 164 Wn.2d 329, 356, 190 P.3d  
11 38 (2008).

12 Kittitas County's development regulations provide standards for  
13 PUD's and Cluster Platting that comply with the GMA. As PUD's are a  
14 zoning designation under the Kittitas County code, they must comport  
15 with both KCC 17.04.020 and 17.98.020(5), and so the exact same points  
16 made in the above paragraph regarding these code sections and three-acre  
17 zoning apply to PUD's. The Cluster Platting regulations specifically call  
18 for the protection of rural character and prevention of sprawl as required  
19 by the GMA, as well as protection of water resources by limiting the use  
20

1 of exempt wells and septic systems. KCC 16.09.010; AR 21. Similar  
2 GMA-required protection of rural character can be found at KCC  
3 16.09.040(D) where the requirement that cluster plats comply with all  
4 existing regulations such as zoning, subdivision code, road standards,  
5 shoreline management, critical areas, and flood plains is found. AR 23.

6 At pages 5 and 6 of its brief, Roslyn asserts that various non-  
7 residential uses affect density such as restaurants, general commercial and  
8 retail. This is despite the fact that density is defined as dwelling units per  
9 acre (KCC 17.08.197), and therefore these uses are irrelevant to density  
10 calculation.

11 At page 6 of its brief, Roslyn takes issue with the County Transfer  
12 of Development Rights Program (TDR). This is despite the fact that  
13 Kittitas County's TDR Ordinance was just adopted in 2010, has never  
14 been adjudicated by the Hearings Board, is not present in the record in this  
15 matter, and is not a part of this or any appeal. Nothing about Kittitas  
16 County's TDR is before this or any court. New issues may not be raised  
17 for the first time on appeal by amici curiae. *Harmon v. DSHS*, 134 Wn.2d  
18 523, 544, 951 P.2d 770 (1998).  
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1 At page 7 of its brief, Roslyn fails to grasp the distinction between  
2 urban and rural bonus points. As should be clear, KCC 16.09.090 awards  
3 different amounts of bonus points to the same feature depending upon  
4 whether the development is in or outside of a UGA. If it is within a UGA,  
5 then it gets the urban point level, if out in the county, it gets the rural level.  
6 Roslyn misread the regulation to think the County was labeling these  
7 development features as urban. As is clear from the regulation, the  
8 County is not labeling these features as urban. The County is awarding  
9 different bonus amounts depending upon whether the development is  
10 within or outside the UGA.<sup>16</sup>

## 11 2. Water

12 Roslyn misrepresents state law and county code related to water in  
13 its Amicus brief. At page 11 of its Amicus brief, Roslyn asserts that the  
14 County has nothing in place to protect quantity and quality of water as  
15 required by the GMA. Besides the numerous provisions of the GMA that  
16 govern the County, and provide such protections, Kittitas County has  
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19  
20 <sup>16</sup> As was explained above, cluster plat issues (related to Ch 16.09 KCC) were  
21 abandoned at the Hearings Board level by Futurewise from Issue number two that the  
County appealed, and so are not amongst the issues the County is contesting here. The  
County only brings these points forward for clarity.

1 numerous code provisions further protecting water that have already been  
2 described in its response to the DOE Amicus brief on pages 7-8 and 13-14.

3 At page 11 of its Amicus brief, Roslyn asserts that there is a  
4 problem with, or lack of authority for the notion of giving notice to other  
5 entities with specialized jurisdiction and expertise and relying upon their  
6 comments. Providing such notice and considering such comment is a  
7 requirement of the State Environmental Policy Act. RCW 43.21C.030(d),  
8 (g), and (h). It is a planning goal and specific requirement of the GMA.  
9 RCW 36.70A.020(11), 36.70A.035. It is also specifically required for  
10 counties planning under the GMA. RCW 36.70B.060(2). Hence, there is  
11 ample authority for the proposition that a county can and should send out  
12 notice to entities with different jurisdiction and expertise for comment,  
13 and consider that comment in making various decisions and that doing so  
14 fulfills a GMA requirement.

15  
16 At page 12 of its brief, Roslyn expresses an ignorance of what is  
17 part of the GMA when it contends that complying with RCW 19.27.097  
18 cannot equate with meeting a GMA mandate. It is important for the Court  
19 to remember that (1) not all of the GMA is found in Ch 36.70A RCW and  
20 that (2) the GMA spells out what a county must do to protect quantity and  
21

1 quality of water. The GMA was enacted in 1990 and is found in the 1<sup>st</sup>  
2 Extraordinary Session Ch 17 of the Session Laws of that year. The GMA  
3 contains specific requirements that explain how a county meets its  
4 obligation from RCW 36.70A.020(10) to protect the quantity and quality  
5 of water, and many of these requirements were not codified in Ch 36.70A  
6 RCW. Section 33 from the GMA provides that sewer and water systems  
7 must comport with comprehensive plans and is codified at RCW  
8 36.94.040.<sup>17</sup> Section 34 of the GMA provides an extra 60 days for sewer  
9 districts to comply with comprehensive plans and is codified at RCW  
10 56.08.020.<sup>18</sup> Section 35 from the GMA provides an extra 60 days for  
11 water districts to comply with comprehensive plans and is codified at  
12 RCW 57.16.010.<sup>19</sup> Section 51 of the GMA provides that plats and short  
13 plats can only be approved in accord with RCW 58.17.110 and amends  
14 RCW 58.17.060.<sup>20</sup> Section 52 of the GMA requires counties make a  
15 finding of provision of potable water prior to subdivision approval and  
16 amends RCW 58.17.110.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps most importantly, section 63 of the  
17 GMA creates RCW 19.27.097 and required an adequate supply of potable  
18

19  
20 17 1990 1<sup>st</sup> Ex. Sess. Ch. 17 §33.

21 18 1990 1<sup>st</sup> Ex. Sess. Ch. 17 §34.

22 19 1990 1<sup>st</sup> Ex. Sess. Ch. 17 §35.

23 20 1990 1<sup>st</sup> Ex. Sess. Ch. 17 §51.

24 21 1990 1<sup>st</sup> Ex. Sess. Ch. 17 §52.

1 water before a building permit can be issued.<sup>22</sup> Hence, all of these sections  
2 of the RCW are part of the GMA even though not codified under Ch.  
3 36.70A RCW and by meeting those requirements, a county fulfils its  
4 GMA obligation to protect quantity and quality of water. This comes  
5 down to two questions at the platting and building permit stage-is the  
6 amount of water adequate and is the water potable? As has already been  
7 described in the County's response to DOE, adequacy is guided by the  
8 State Health Department rules and policies, and potability is satisfied by  
9 passing a bacteriological test required by County code. Whether one  
10 legally has the right to use water is reserved in Title 90 RCW for the DOE  
11 in an action before the Superior Court. Nothing in Title 90 RCW nor the  
12 GMA gives a county authority to determine whether one has a legal right  
13 to use water.

14  
15 At page 13 of its brief, Roslyn mischaracterizes KCC 16.24.210.  
16 Contrary to Roslyn's contention, KCC 16.24.210 does require well logs  
17 and passing a bacteriological test. In describing what is required upon the  
18 face of a plat, KCC 16.24.210 requires in pertinent part "a statement as to  
19 the suitability of...public water supplies installed in the subdivision signed  
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21 <sup>22</sup> 1990 1<sup>st</sup> Ex. Sess. Ch. 17 §63.



1 by the health officer.” The language upon the face of the plat affirms that  
2 “Well information consisting of a well log, satisfactory bacteriological test  
3 and four hour draw down has been submitted and reviewed.” The County  
4 code provisions provide that the County’s GMA requirement that there be  
5 adequate and potable water at the subdivision and building permit stage is  
6 satisfied.

7 Roslyn similarly mischaracterizes the County’s position on  
8 *Campbell & Gwinn* at page 14 of its brief. The County refers the Court to  
9 its discussion of *Campbell & Gwinn* already in the record at pages 13-14  
10 of its response to the DOE. Simply speaking, the case stands for the  
11 proposition that multiple wells in a development constitute one withdrawal  
12 and will violate the Ch. 90.44 RCW exemption from permitting if  
13 requiring a combined output of over 5,000 gallons per day, and that that  
14 was properly determined by the Superior Court in an action brought by the  
15 DOE.<sup>23</sup> *Campbell & Gwinn* does not stand for the proposition that a  
16 county can or should deny a plat application or building permit based upon  
17 its estimation of whether the proposed provision of water fits within the  
18 exemption of Ch. 90.44 RCW because that determination is specifically  
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23 146 Wn.2d 1, 21, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

1 reserved for the Superior Court to decide in an action brought by DOE (as  
2 was done in *Campbell & Gwinn*). County role and responsibility was not  
3 an issue in *Campbell & Gwinn*, indeed, Yakima County was not even a  
4 party to the action.

5 It is important to remember the issue in this case is whether the  
6 County violates the GMA by not requiring lists of lands in common  
7 ownership as part of a subdivision application. As has been explained  
8 previously in this brief, and in the County's responses to DOE and  
9 Earthjustice, the determination of what is a development, and so what  
10 constitutes one withdrawal, as in *Campbell & Gwinn*, is between the  
11 developer, DOE, and the Superior Court. That would be the determination  
12 that would benefit from having information of lands in common  
13 ownership. That determination does not involve a county, and so by not  
14 requiring information that would only be used to make a determination  
15 that a county does not make, the county cannot be violating the GMA.  
16 The GMA cannot be violated because a county does not require  
17 information that is useless to any determination it is called upon to make.  
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
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IV. CONCLUSION

Kittitas County provides for appropriate rural densities and controls with its three-acre zoning and PUD's. The County does not violate the GMA's requirement to protect water resources by not requiring disclosure of land in common ownership in development application as such a requirement is not relevant to any determination the county makes. Furthermore, the County complies with the GMA requirement to protect quantity and quality of water by following the GMA requirements, many of which are not codified in Ch. 36.70A RCW, that require findings of adequacy and potability.

Respectfully submitted this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October,  
2010.

  
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